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In 1972 Congress amended the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act of 1927.' As Congress recognized,
amendments to the Act were "long overdue. ' 2 The Act, which had
not been amended since 1961, had established maximum benefits at
seventy dollars per week for a disabled worker.3 By 1972, however,
the average longshoreman's weekly salary had risen to over two
hundred dollars.! In order to adequately protect the wage earner and
his family from income loss during periods of disability, a substantial
increase in benefits was necessary.5
Although stevedore-employer groups acknowledged this need to
increase benefits,' they asserted that in order for such legislation to
have their support a long line of Supreme Court decisions had to be
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I Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, 86
Stat. 1251 (codified at 33 U.S.C. 902-903, 905-910, 912-914, 917, 919, 921a, 923, 928, 933, 935,
939, 940, 944, and 948a (Supp. IV 1974). The Act provides coverage for over 800,000 employ-
ees, only one-third of whom are longshoremen and harbor workers. The remainder are District
of Columbia employees, civilian workers at military bases outside of the United States, employ-
ees within the scope of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, and certain workers of nonap-
propriated fund instrumentalities of the Armed Forces. See Comment The Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972: An End to Circular Liability and
Seaworthiness in Return for Modern Benefits, 27 U. MIAMI L. REv. 94, 94-95 (1972). This
article will be concerned only with the effect of the 1972 amendments upon longshoremen and
harbor workers.
2 H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4698, 4700 [hereinafter cited as [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws].
Id. When the Act was first enacted in 1927, compensation was fixed at two-thirds of a
disabled employee's weekly wage but not exceeding $25.00 per week. Act of March 4, 1927,
ch. 509, § 6, 44 Stat. 1426. In 1948 the maximum weekly compensation recovery was increased
to $35.00. Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 623, § 1, 62 Stat. 602. In 1956 this amount was raised to
$54.00. Act of July 26, 1956, ch. 735, § 1, 70 Stat. 654. And in 1961, the last raise prior to the
1972 amendments, this weekly sum was increased to $70.00. Act of July 14, 1961, Pub. L. No.
87-87, § 1, 75 Stat. 203 (amending 33 U.S.C. § 906 (1956)).
[19721 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698.
I d. at 4698-99.
Id. at 4699.
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modified.7 Generally, these rulings held that under the doctrine of
seaworthiness a shipowner warranted the safety of his vessel and was
liable regardless of fault for injuries incurred by employees covered
by the Act.' Further, a shipowner was able under the concept of
indemnity to recover the damages for which he was liable to the
injured employee from the stevedore-employer on theories of breach
of express or implied warranty of workmanlike performance.'
Clearly, the stevedore-employer was in an unenviable position.
He was not only subject to compensation payments based upon strict
liability but he frequently was forced to reimburse the shipowner for
damages paid to the longshoreman in a third-party action. The
stevedore-employer was, however, entitled to a lien to the extent of
compensation payments made on the recovery the employee received
in the third-party action.10 Nevertheless, the stevedore-employer
felt-often with good reason-that he was bearing more than his fair
share of the costs."t
Shipowners, on the other hand, feared that the abolition of their
indemnity action against the stevedore-employers coupled with the
preservation of the seaworthiness doctrine would subject them to
severe liability. 12 They were therefore in favor of prohibiting third-
party actions altogether. 3 Realizing that Congress was not likely to
immunize them from third-party suits under all circumstances, the
shipowners consented to a provision that would subject them to liabil-
ity to an injured longshoreman only if the injury were caused by the
shipowner's negligence. 4
Thus, in enacting the 1972 amendments Congress was concerned
with achieving the following goals: (1) the implementation of a com-
Id.
E.g., Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946). See text accompanying notes
17-19 infra.
I Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). See text
accompanying notes 30-32 infra.
to 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1970); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953). See text
accompanying notes 26-29 infra.
1 See [1972] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 4701-03. As stated in the House Report,
prior to the 1972 amendments, "the end result [was] that, despite the provision in the Act which
limit[edj an employer's liability to the compensation and medical benefits provided in the Act,
a stevedore-employer [was] ifdirectly liable for damages to an injured longshoreman who
utilize[d] the technique of suing the vessel under the unseaworthiness doctrine." Id. at 4702.
12 See Senate Hearings, Subcommittee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
270-74 (1972), excerpted in Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges., 379 F. Supp. 759, 769-72
(E.D. Pa. 1974).
13 Mr Scanlon, a representative speaking in behalf of the shipowners, remarked: "We
think, Mr. Chairman, that all cases against the shipowner. . . should be eliminated; and the
reason for that is, it is awfully difficult to try to limit negligence cases with respect to a
shipowner where you have the maritime law such as it is." 379 F. Supp. at 772.
14 Id.
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pensation payment scheme that would increase longshoremen's bene-
fits to a level commensurate with present-day realities; (2) the elimi-
nation of the concepts of seaworthiness and indemnity; (3) the estab-
lishment of a third-party action allowing the longshoreman to sue the
shipowner for negligence; and (4) the limitation that the stevedore-
employer would not be liable directly or indirectly for any damages
recovered against the shipowner in a negligence action. 15 In an effort
to secure the latter three interests Congress enacted 33 U.S.C. §
905(b), which provides:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused
by the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise
entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action
against such vessel as a third party in accordance with the provisions
of section 933 of this title and the employer shall not be liable to
the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any agree-
ments or warranties to the contrary shall be void. If such person was
employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services, no such
action shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence
of persons engaged in providing stevedoring services to the vessel.
If such person was employed by the vessel to provide ship building
or repair services, no such action shall be permitted if the injury was
caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing ship build-
ing or repair services to the vessel. The liability of the vessel under
this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of seaworthi-
ness or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred. The remedy
provided in this subsection shall be exclusive of all other remedies
against the vessel except remedies available under this chapter.
Unfortunately, Congress' enactment of the above statute left
unresolved many of the perplexing questions that were before it.
Rather than clearly enunciating the answers to these issues, this inart-
fully drawn provision has left both the courts and commentators with
no other alternative but to speculate about its meaning. This confu-
sion is centered around the situation in which the longshoreman sus-
tains an injury due to the negligence of both the stevedore-employer
and the shipowner. In such a case, is the longshoreman entitled to
recover the full amount of his damages in a negligence action against
the shipowner? If the shipowner is sued-by the longshoreman in a
third-party action and loses, is the shipowner entitled to contribution
against the concurrently negligent stevedore-employer? If the
stevedore-employer is concurrently negligent in causing the long-
shoreman's injury, is he nevertheless allowed a lien upon the plain-
" See [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4700-05.
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tiff's judgment to recover past compensation payments?
The purpose of this article is to examine these troublesome ques-
tions. It must be emphasized that, due to the ambiguities of § 905(b)
and its legislative history, the answers are by no means clear. To
provide some guidance in this difficult area, this article first will
discuss the relevant Supreme Court rulings prior to the 1972 amend-
ments. Thereafter, the applicable judicial decisions that have consid-
ered these issues since the enactment of § 905(b) will be examined.
Finally, the article will analyze how the Supreme Court should re-
solve these questions if and when the Court determines it proper to
confront them.
I. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS PRIOR To THE 1972 AMENDMENTS
Rather than supply an exhaustive critique of Supreme Court
decisions prior to the 1972 amendments, this section will concentrate
on those holdings that had the greatest impact in prompting Congress
to enact the amendments, particularly § 905(b).11 Also, those Su-
preme Court rulings that arguably have survived the 1972 amend-
ments and that have great significance for the issues raised later in
this article will be discussed.
In 1946 the Supreme Court decided Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sierackiy1 which extended the traditional seaman's remedy, founded
on the breach of the shipowner's absolute nondelegable obligation to
provide a seaworthy vessel, to longshoremen." The basis for afford-
ing the longshoreman this seaworthiness cause of action was the
Court's belief that "he [was] doing a seaman's work and incurring a
seaman's hazards."'19
" For law review articles that discuss the 1972 amendments from a general perspective.
see Comment, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of
1972: An End to Circular Liability and Seaworthiness in Return for Modern Benefits. 27 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 94 (1972); Note, Admiralty-Maritime Personal Injury and
Death-Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972. 47
TULANE L. REV. 1151 (1973); Note, Maritime Jurisdiction and Longshoremen's Remedies.
1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 649.
'7 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
's Prior to Sieracki, the seaworthiness remedy was afforded only to seamen. Mahnich v.
Southern Steamship Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). It must be
emphasized that this doctrine imposes absolute liability upon the shipowner. As defined by the
Sieracki Court, this form of liability
is essentially. . . without fault, analogous to other well known instances in our law.
Derived from and shaped to meet the hazards which performing the service imposes,
the liability is neither limited by conceptions of negligence nor contractual in
character . . . . It is a form of absolute duty owing to all within the range of its
humanitarian policy.
328 U.S. at 94-95 (footnotes omitted).
"9 328 U.S. at 99.
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The obvious result of Sieracki was that the vessel owners were
subject to an increasing number of damage suits. Because these third-
party actions greatly burdened their financial resources, shipowners
attempted to shift part or all of these costs to the stevedore-
employer. 0 The vessel owners' initial effort to secure this result was
in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling and Refitting Corp.21 In that
case the jury found that the plaintiff's injury was due seventy-five
percent to the stevedore-employer's negligence anid twenty-five per-
cent to the shipowner's negligence. The vessel owner argued that for
this reason the employer should be required to make contribution. 22
In pertinent part, § 905(a) of the Act, both at the time of Halycon
and after the 1972 amendments, stated that the stevedore-employer's
duty to provide compensation benefits to an injured employee was to
"be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to
the employee. . . and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages
from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury
or death . . . ."3 In spite of this language, the shipowner contended
that the exclusivity provision did not apply to him. The Halycon
Court did not reach this question. Rather, it first recognized that it
had never expressly extended the doctrine of contribution to noncolli-
sion cases. 4 The Court then concluded that under the circumstances
present in such a situation, "it would be unwise to attempt to fashion
new judicial rules of contribution and that the solution of this prob-
lem should await congressional action." z
The shipowner in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn 2  pursued an-
other approach. He argued that since the stevedore-employer had
negligently contributed to the plaintiffs injuries, the judgment
against him should be reduced by the amount of compensation pay-
ments that the employee had received from the employer. Directly
confronting this assertion, the Court rejected it.Y First, the Court
" See Cohen & Dougherty, The 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act: An Opportunity for Equitable Uniformity in Tripartite Industrial
Accident Litigation, 19 N.Y.L.F. 587, 590-91 (1974).
21 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
2 Id. at 283-84. Prior to Halcyon, the federal circuits had been divided as to whether
contribution was permissible in this situation. Compare United States v. Rothschild Int'l
Stevedoring Co., 183 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1950), with American Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mathews, 182
F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1950).
2 Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, § 5, 44 Stat. 1426
(1927) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (Supp. IV 1974)) (emphasis added).
21 342 U.S. at 284.
I1 d. at 285.
21 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
" Id. at 411-12. In addition, the longshoreman was contributorily negligent in causing his
own injuries. Based on this negligence, the shipowner argued that the plaintiff's conduct should
act as a complete bar to his recovery. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the longshore-
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noted that § 933 contained at that time (and after the 1972 amend-
ments) specific provisions authorizing the stevedore-employer to re-
cover his compensation payments out of any damages award from a
third party who had negligently caused the employee's injuries. If the
shipowner's contention were accepted, the Court concluded, it would
frustrate the purpose of § 933 of protecting employers who were
absolutely liable under that Act."8 As importantly, the Court held that
reduction of the shipowner's liability at the expense of the employer
"would be the substantial equivalent of contribution which we dec-
lined to require in the Halycon case." 9
After the Court's decisions in Halcyon and Pope & Talbot, the
shipowner was left with one last alternative to save himself from
ultimate financial liability under the seaworthiness doctrine. That
alternative was based on the concept of indemnity. In Ryan Stevedor-
ing Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp.,"0 the Court adopted the
shipowner's argument that since a suit to recover indemnity was not
brought "on account of such injury" to the longshoreman, it was
therefore not barred by the exclusivity provision of § 905(a).3 1 The
Court reasoned that the shipowner's indemnity claim arose out of the
stevedore-employer's breach of an implied warranty of workmanlike
performance .3  By the late 1960's, further extensions of Ryan made
clear that despite § 905(a), which purportedly limited the stevedore-
employer's liability to the compensation and medical payments pro-
vided by the Act, the employer was in fact solely liable for all dam-
ages recovered by his injured employee. 33
man's negligence may, at most, mitigate his recovery. In rejecting the shipowner's argument,
the Court reflected:
The harsh rule of the common law under which contributory negligence wholly
barred an injured person from recovery is completely incompatible with modern
admiralty policy and practice. Exercising its traditional discretion, admiralty has
developed and now follows its own fairer and more flexible rule which allows such
consideration of contributory negligence in mitigation of damages as justice requires.
Id. at 408-09. The 1972 amendments do not change this rule authorizing comparative negli-
gence. See note 42 infra.
346 U.S. at 412.
hId.
350 U.S. 124 (1956).
Id. at 130.
32 Id. at 128-34. For cases decided after the 1972 amendments which discuss Ryan. see
Celia v. Partenreederei M.S. Ravenna, 529 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44
U.S.L.W. 3659 (1976); Brkaric v. Star Iron & Steel Co., 409 F. Supp. 516, 519 (E.D. N.Y.
1976); Slaughter v. S.S. Ronde Fyffes Group, 390 F. Supp. 637, 638-39 (S.D. Ga. 1974). affd.
509 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1975); Ramirez v. Toko Kaiun K.K., 385 F. Supp. 644, 649 (N.D. Cal.
1974). See also Bess v. Agromar Line, 518 F.2d 738, 740-43 (4th Cir. 1975).
3 See, e.g., Italia Societa per Anzioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376
U.S. 315 (1964); Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959); McLaughlin
v. Trelleborgs Angfartygs A/B, 408 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 946 (1969).
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Thus, by its decisions in Sieracki and Ryan, the Court provided
longshoremen with third-party actions against vessel owners under
the seaworthiness doctrine and then transferred the ultimate liability
for these damages to the stevedore-employers. The Court had en-
gaged in judicial legislation at its outermost extreme. Dissatisfied
with the compensation system and its attending obsolete benefits, the
Court felt that justice demanded that it act, for it appeared that
Congress was not about to remedy the situation.3' This humanitarian
philosophy manifested itself in providing the longshoreman with a
third-party suit and placing the burden of these costs on the party
who was best able to bear them-the stevedore-employer."
With the increasing number of third-party actions prompted by
the Sieracki and Ryan holdings, shipowners and stevedore-employers
were compelled to devote an increasing proportion of their financial
resources to pay these successful claimants and to defray litigation
expenses." Arguing that remedial congressional legislation would
permit them to pay higher compensation awards, the stevedore-
employers called for legislative action.37 In 1972 Congress responded
by enacting the amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act.
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS AFTER THE 1972 AMENDMENTS
In enacting § 905(b), Congress sought to permit a longshoreman
to bring a third-party suit against the shipowner for negligence only,
rather than for unseaworthiness, and also sought to ensure that the
longshoreman's employer would not be held liable for any damages
recovered in such an action." Unfortunately, much controversy has
1 See Comment, Negligence Standards Under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act: Examining the Viewpoints, 21 VILL. L. REv.
244, 250-51 (1976). See also Note, Risk Distribution and Seaworthiness. 75 YALE L.J. 1174,
1184-85 (1966).
1 See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 108 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting),
in which Justice Frankfurter stated:
The whole philosophy of liability without fault is that losses which are incidental to
socially desirable conduct should be placed on those best able to bear them. Congress
had made a determination that the employer is best able to bear the loss which, in
this instance, could not be avoided by the exercise of due care. This is an implied
determination which should preclude us from saying that the ship owner is in a more
favorable position to absorb the loss or to pass it on to society at large, than the
employer.
Id. at 108 (emphasis added).
See [19721 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4702.
n Id. at 4698-99.
11 Id. at 4704. The House Report provides:
The Committee also believes that the doctrine of the Ryan case, which permits the
vessel to recover the damages for which it is liable to an injured worker where it can
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arisen about cases in which the longshoreman's injuries are caused
by the negligence of both the shipowner and the stevedore-employer.
As noted earlier in this article, three basic questions must be con-
fronted in this situation: (1) Is the employee entitled to recover the
full amount of his damages in a negligence action against the ship-
owner? (2) If the employee recovers damages in a third-party action
against the shipowner, is the shipowner entitled to contribution
against the concurrently negligent stevedore-employer? (3) If the
employer is concurrently negligent in causing the employee's injury,
is he nevertheless allowed a lien upon the plaintiffs judgment to
recover past compensation payments? The courts, in considering
these questions since the 1972 amendments, have split into three
different camps. In this section each of these views will be examined.
Later in this article an attempt will be made to determine which
approach is the correct one.
A. The Majority View
The prevailing view is that an employee is allowed to recover his
full damages against the negligent shipowner, that contribution
against the stevedore-employer is impermissible, and that, even
though concurrently negligent, the employer is entitled to recoup his
compensation payments in full. The leading cases representing this
approach are two companion cases decided by the Ninth Circuit in
the latter part of 1975. In Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K. K.
Tokyo3 the shipowner and stevedore-employer were found to be
equally negligent in causing the longshoreman's injury.,' In Shellman
v. United States Lines, Inc.,4" the employer was found to be seventy
percent negligent and the vessel owner thirty percent negligent in
causing the injury.4
show that the stevedore breaches an express or implied warranty of workmanlike
performance is no longer appropriate if the vessel's liability is no longer to be
absolute, as it essentially is under the seaworthiness doctrine. Since the vessel's
liability is to be based on its own negligence, and the vessel will no longer be liable
under the seaworthiness doctrine for injuries which are really the fault of the steve-
dore, there is no longer any necessity for permitting the vessel to recover the damages
for which it is liable to the injured worker from the stevedore or other employer of
the worker.
3, 528 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3593 (1976), affg 1975 A.M.C.
1505 (D. Ore..1974).
4" 528 F.2d at 670.
"1 528 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3593 (1976), revg 1975 A.M.C.
362 (C.D. Cal. 1974). The district court decision is discussed later in this article. See text
accompanying notes 75-82 infra.
42 528 F.2d at 676. In Shellman the court emphasized that the longshoreman was not
contributorily negligent. If he were, the less harsh doctrine of comparative negligence would
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On the contribution issue, the court noted in Dodge and in a
footnote in Shellman" that the facts of those cases were similar to
those presented before the Supreme Court in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn
Ship Ceiling and Refitting Corp. Since the Halcyon Court denied a
right of contribution to the shipowner, the Ninth Circuit concluded,
Halcyon was controlling on the contribution issue unless that decision
had been modified by later Supreme Court authority or the 1972
amendments." Upon examining the relevant authorities, the court
concluded that Halcyon was still good law, and hence contribution
was disallowed. 5
On the question whether the court should deny the stevedore-
employer a lien upon the longshoreman's judgment because he had
been concurrently negligent, the Ninth Circuit was faced with the
question whether the Supreme Court's holding in Pope & Talbot, Inc.
v. Hawn" was still controlling or had been modified by later author-
ity. In accord with its analysis of the Halcyon issue, the court held
that Pope & Talbot was binding. 7 Relying on the high Court's lan-
guage in that case, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "the reduction
of the stevedore's recovery would be another form of contribution
which the Act seeks to prohibit." In an accompanying footnote,
however, the court emphasized that it had reached its conclusion not
necessarily because of the fairness of that approach but because it was
obligated to do so by controlling Supreme Court authority:
It is indeed questionable whether it is equitable for the stevedore
employer to recover the full amount of its compensation payments
even if its negligence were a concurring cause of the longshoreman's
injuries. The issue before us, however, is not whether Halcyon and
Pope & Talbot were correctly decided. Rather, because these deci-
sions are still good law, our obligation is to apply the principles of
those cases to the facts presently before us."
apply. Id. at 676-77 n.l. As stated in the House Report, "the committee intends that the
admiralty concept of comparative negligence, rather than the common law rule as to contribu-
tory negligence, shall apply in cases where the injured employee's own negligence may have
contributed to causing the injury." [19721 U.S. CoDE CONG. & Ao. News 4705. See note 27
supra.
528 F.2d at 670; 528 F.2d at 678-79 n.2.
" 528 F.2d at 670; 528 F.2d at 679 n.2.
528 F.2d at 671; 528 F.2d at 679 n.2.
" 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
+' 528 F.2d at 673; 528 F.2d at 679 n.2.
" 528 F.2d at 673. In Shellman the court phrased this conclusion in slightly different
terms: "Contribution is still prohibited and any indirect method to accomplish the same result
is also prohibited." 528 F.2d at 679 n.2.
" 528 F.2d at 673 n.I.
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Turning next to the question whether the longshoreman should
be entitled to recover his full damages from the shipowner, the court
decided to adopt the prevailing view in favor of recovery for the
reason that the minority rationales imposed "unjustified burdens
upon the injured longshoreman."' 0 In so holding, the court particu-
larly relied upon district court decisions within that circuit which also
had preferred the majority view. Quoting a district court ruling from
Oregon,5 the court observed that the cases before it were instances
of concurring negligence which, under traditional negligence princi-
ples, entitled the employee to recover his full damages from the negli-
gent vessel owner.52 Turning to a Washington case,53 the court noted
that, although it may appear inequitable for a shipowner to be liable
to the longshoreman for all of his damages in such a situation, it must
be remembered that reducing the employee's recovery would not
eliminate the inequity. The longshoreman "would be restricted in his
recovery as against the shipowner without acquiring any offsetting
rights under the Act as against his stevedore employer."" On this
basis, the court held that the longshoreman could recover his full
damages from the shipowner." In conclusion the court stated that "it
is for Congress and not for the courts to create a solution to this
problem.""
The Second Circuit has also adopted the majority view. In
Landon v. Lief Hoegh and Co.5 7 the injured longshoreman brought a
negligence action against the shipowner. 8 The shipowner thereupon
o 528 F.2d at 672; 528 F.2d at 680. See Santino v. Liberian Distance Transports, Inc.,
405 F. Supp. 34, 35 (W.D. Wash. 1975); Solsvik v. Maremar Compania Naviera, 399 F. Supp.
712, 714 (W.D. Wash. 1975).
" Hubbard v. Great Pac. Shipping Co., 404 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Ore. 1975).
52 528 F.2d at 679-80, 528 F.2d at 672 (quoting 404 F. Supp. at 1244). Hence, "because
the shipowner's negligence was a concurring cause in producing the longshoreman's injuries,
the shipowner is liable for the total of the plaintiffs damages." 528 F.2d at 680.
Santino v. Liberian Distance Transports, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 34 (W.D. Wash. 1975).
5' 528 F.2d at 672, 528 F.2d at 680 (quoting 405 F. Supp. at 35).
528 F.2d at 673; 528 F.2d at 680.
528 F.2d at 673; 528 F.2d at 681. The Dodge and Shellman decisions are supported by
the well-reasoned opinion in Fitzgerald v. Compania Naviera La Molinera, 394 F. Supp. 402
(E.D. La. 1974). Also, the First Circuit, recently reflecting on Dodge and Shellman, stated:
"Under recent decisions, the stevedore receives full reimbursement of its compensation pay-
ments even if it was currently [sic] negligent in causing the longshoreman's injuries . . .and
cannot otherwise be compelled to contribute to the longshoreman's recovery." Celia v. Parten-
reederei M.S. Ravenna, 529 F.2d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3659 (1976)
(footnotes omitted). The Ninth Circuit's decisions in Dodge and Shellman were sharply criti-
cized by Coleman & Daly, Equitable Credit: Apportionment of Damages According To Fault
in Tripartite Litigation under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act, 35 MD. L. REv. 351, 412-13 (1976).
51 386 F. Supp. 1081 (E.D. N.Y. 1974), affd, 521 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1975).
51 386 F. Supp. at 1082.
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moved to join the stevedoring contractor and its compensation car-
rier. The district judge denied the motion, holding that the stevedore
and its carrier were liable only to the extent of compensation pay-
ments to be made under the Act.59 On appeal the Second Circuit
affirmed. Agreeing with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, the court held
that both Halcyon and Pope & Talbot were still good law."0 Hence,
under controlling Supreme Court authority, the shipowner was not
entitled to reduce his damages to the longshoreman by the amount
of compensation payments made by the employer."' The shipowner
in Landon also argued that the 1972 amendments should be inter-
preted in such a manner that the employee could recover in a third-
party suit only if his injury was incurred solely through the negligence
of the shipowner without any concurring negligence on the part of the
stevedore-employer. Upon examining the amendments, the Second
Circuit found this contention to be wholly without merit: "We cannot
agree that some negligence by the employer is enough to cut off the
injured longshoreman's protected right to sue the ship for its own
negligence." 2
The major district court decision adhering to the prevailing view
was rendered by a three-judge court in the Third Circuit.63 After an
exhaustive treatment of the relevant Supreme Court cases and the
legislative history of the 1972 amendments, 4 the court concluded that
51 Id. at 1084. Accord, Davillier v. Cavn Venezuelan Line, 407 F. Supp. 1234, 1236-38
(E.D. La. 1976).
' 521 F.2d at 760. The decision in Landon was rendered prior to Dodge and Shellman.
" Id. at 763.
£2 Id. The Second Circuit remarked that if Congress had intended that the shipowner be
held liable only when his negligence was the sole cause in producing the longshoremen's injury,
it could have inserted the word "sole" within § 905(b), so that the provision would have read
"caused by the 'sole' negligence of the vessel." Id. In regard to this issue in the district court,
the trial judge stated:
Was Section 905(b) meant, in exchange for abolishing the unseaworthiness ground
of liability, to abolish every sort of right to pass on some or all of the shipowner's
liability to the longshoreman to the employer? Even if that meant that a trivial, but
legally sufficient amount of negligence toward the longshoreman would enable the
employer to off-load to the shipowner his entire liability under the Act even though
the employer's negligence was the most significant proximate cause of the accident,
and the employer was in breach of duties that he owed to the shipowner in respect
of the accident and damage?
The language of Section 905(b) leaves no room for escape from the conclusion
that the section means exactly that sweeping and painful result. The examination of
the background and history of the legislative change. . . confirms the conclusion.
386 F. Supp. at 1084 (citations omitted). See also Galimi v. Jetco, Inc., 514 F.2d 949, 954-56
(2d Cir. 1975); Smith v. Rivest, 396 F. Supp. 379, 383 (D. Wis. 1975).
13 Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges., 379 F. Supp. 759 (E.D. Pa. 1974). A panel of
three district judges was convened in Lucas and its accompanying cases because of the large
number of cases pending in that district which raised identical issues. Id. at 760.
11 Id. at 761-68.
37 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 767 (1976)
the stevedore-employer's liability under the Act was limited to com-
pensation payments. 5 It further held that the longshoreman could sue
the shipowner for his full damages in a negligence action even though
the stevedore-employer had been concurrently negligent." The court
recognized that its ruling left the shipowner in an unenviable position.
But, like other tribunals adopting the prevailing view, the court
viewed its holding as the only available alternative. Otherwise,
The various methods proposed by the vessel owners to shift their
tort liability would cause a disruption in the scheme provided by
Congress. To this extent the wisdom of the Halcyon case endures.
It is for Congress to provide the proper balance. Courts' sense of
fairness can only prove disruptive of that balance. 7
Thus the courts representing the majority view have accepted
this approach, not necessarily because it furthers the interests of
justice, but because they have felt themselves bound by controlling
authority. According to these courts, if this inequitable situation is
to be remedied, the cure must be advanced by the Supreme Court or
Congress; until then, judicial activism in this sensitive area can only
complicate the problem rather than alleviate it."
B. The Equitable Credit-Shellman Doctrine
In a 1974 law review article, Cohen and Dougherty proposed
new criteria which they believed would guarantee equitable uniform-
ity in tripartite litigation under the 1972 amendments. 9 Their ap-
proach has been supported in a well-researched work recently pub-
lished by Coleman and Daly.7 In addition, at least three district
courts have been persuaded by the soundness of this approach. 71
Other courts, particularly the Second and Ninth Circuits, while
aware of the arguments advanced in support of this view, have re-
jected it.12
Id. at 768-69.
"Id. at 769.
"Id.
See Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 528 F.2d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1975). cert.
denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3593 (1976); Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669,
673 n.1 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3593 (1976); Solsvik v. Maremar Compania
Naviera, 399 F. Supp. 712, 714 (W.D. Wash. 1975); Landon v. Lief Hoegh & Co., 386 F. Supp.
1081, 1084 (E.D. N.Y. 1974), affd, 521 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1975).
d Cohen & Dougherty, supra note 20.
70 Coleman and Daly, supra note 56.
" Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Ore. 1975);
Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 1143,judgment n.o.v., 394 F. Supp. 1092
(D. Md. 1975); Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 362 (C.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd
528 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3593 (1976).
" See, e.g., Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669, 671-72 (9th Cir.
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As proposed by Cohen and Dougherty and their supporters, the
Equitable Credit Doctrine contains the following basic provisions:
[1 ] An employee injured in the course of his employment recovers
workmen's compensation benefits from his employer, regardless of
fault. If the injury was not contributed to by the negligence of any
third party, he recovers nothing more than these compensation ben-
efits.
[2] If the injury was caused by the fault of a third party, the
employee may sue such third party for common law damages. His
recovery is to be reduced to the extent of his own contributory
negligence. And, if the employer was not also at fault, the full
amount of all compensation benefits is to be deducted from the
employee's recovery and paid to the employer in reimbursement.
[3] If the employer was a joint tortfeasor, it could be impleaded
or otherwise bound by the third party. However, in such a case, the
actual dollar liability of the employer should not exceed the amount
of the employer's dollar liability in compensation. Just as every
employee will be guaranteed minimum benefits of workmen's com-
pensation, so will every employer be guaranteed a maximum liabil-
ity of compensation benefits, whether directly or indirectly, for any
employee's industrial accident.
The proportional amount of any employer's fault is to go in
mitigation of the third party's damages, in the same fashion as the
employee's contributory negligence, so that the third party actually
responds to the employee only for that amount of the employee's
damages as is equal to the third party's proportion of the fault.
[4] From any recovery the employee obtains from the third party,
the employee is to reimburse the employer for the compensation
benefits paid. However, if any employer negligence resulted in a
diminution or reduction of the employee's recovery against the third
party, the employee may deduct and retain that amount from the
compensation benefits to be reimbursed.
Thus, if the damages attributable to the employer's fault were
less than the amount of the compensation benefits, the employer
would recover only the difference between the amount of the com-
pensation benefits and the amount by which its fault reduced the
employee's recovery. If the employer's fault were in excess of the
compensation benefits, it would not receive any reimbursement, but
neither would it be liable for any excess. In such situation the loss
to the employee is the consideration for the absolute right to com-
pensation benefits regardless of fault.73
1975), cert. denied. 44 U.S.L.W. 3593 (1976); Landon v. Lief Hoegh & Co., 521 F.2d 756. 763
(2d Cir. 1975).
" Cohen & Dougherty, supra note 20, at 606-07. See Coleman & Daly. supra note 56.
at 355-57.
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Upon examination, the third and fourth provisions are the heart of
the doctrine, since they both concern the situation in which the
shipowner and the stevedore-employer are concurrently negligent in
causing the longshoreman's injury. Provision [3] stands for the princi-
ple that the negligent shipowner can be held liable only to the extent
of his proportional fault. The second point advanced in that provision
is that the negligent stevedore-employer's maximum liability cannot
exceed the amount of compensation benefits he has paid under the
Act. Provision [4] establishes criteria by which to determine what
portion of his compensation payments, if any, the stevedore-employer
or his insurer is entitled to recoup in various situations.74
The first district court to adopt the Equitable Credit Doctrine
rendered its opinion in Shellman v. United States Lines Operators,
Inc.,75 which was subsequently reversed by the Ninth Circuit.7 This
decision, which also became known as the Shellman Doctrine, thor-
oughly traced the relevant Supreme Court holdings prior to the 1972
amendments.77 Upon analysis, the court concluded that the amend-
ments had not only modified Sieracki and Ryan, but Halcyon and
Pope & Talbot as well.78 It then concluded that the longshoreman's
recovery against the shipowner must be reduced by the percentage of
both his negligence and the stevedore-employer's negligence.79 This
conclusion, the court felt, was compelled by the language of§ 905(b),
which provides in relevant part that "[i]f such person was employed
by the vessel to provide stevedoring services, no such action shall be
permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons en-
gaged in providing stevedoring services to its vessel."80 As all com-
mentators acknowledge, even those advancing the Equitable Credit
Doctrine,8' the district judge's reasoning is erroneous. The language
in § 905(b) relied upon by the court concerns only those cases in which
the longshoreman is employed directly by the shipowner, and has no
71 Hence, in given situations, the longshoreman's recovery under the Equitable Credit
Doctrine may well be lower than if he were permitted to sue the shipowner for his total damages
regardless of the degree of the third party's fault in causing the injury. See Coleman & Daly,
supra note 56, at 359.
75 1975 A.M.C. 362 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
7' 528 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3593 (1976).
17 l9 5 A.M.C. at 363-66.
7" Id. at 366-69.
7' Id. at 369-70.
Id. at 370.
" See Coleman & Daly, supra note 56, at 388-89. Recognizing this error in Shellman. the
commentators nevertheless concluded that "regardless of the intended meaning of that portion
of Shellman. that language does nothing to undermine the viability of the Shellman credit."
Id. at 389. This assertion is questionable since the district judge pronounced that his holding
was "compelled" by the language of§ 905(b), when in fact he had misinterpreted that provision.
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significance whatsoever when the employee brings a third-party ac-
tion against the vessel.82 Nevertheless, the district court's holding
established new precedent and constituted persuasive authority for
the other district courts that also adhered to the Equitable Credit
Doctrine.
Another district court case that favored the adoption of the
Shellman rule was Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd B.V.
Rijswijk.Y Although the judge conformed his ruling to the prevailing
view in order to maintain uniformity within that district, 4 he con-
cluded that the amendments contemplated the implementation of an
equitable credit when the longshoreman's injury was caused by the
concurring negligence of the shipowner and the stevedore-employer. 5
The inequity of the majority view was obvious: "If the stevedore were
90% negligent, the 10% negligence of the shipowner would be suffi-
cient to cripple him with the entire judgment."86 Furthermore, per-
mitting the negligent stevedore-employer a lien upon the plaintiff's
judgment to recover his compensation payments runs contrary to the
principle that the stevedore-employer's right to reimbursement is
equitable in nature. Accordingly, the stevedore-employer's lien must
be reduced by the amount that his negligence diminished the long-
shoreman's recovery.87
The other district court decision which approved the Equitable
Credit Doctrine was Frasca v. Prudential Grace Lines, Inc.88 Al-
though the court's holding was subsequently rendered moot by its
entry of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 9 the court, in ruling
See Robertson, Negligence Actions by Longshoremen Against Shipowners Under the
1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 7 J. MAR.
L. & COM. 447, 484 (1976).
398 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Ore. 1975).
Because Hubbard v. Great Pac. Shipping Co., 404 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Ore. 1975). was
decided prior to Croshaw, the district judge felt obligated to maintain uniformity of law within
that district. See 398 F. Supp. at 1231.
" 398 F. Supp. at 1231. Upon examining the 1972 amendments, the district judge ac-
knowledged the difficulties present in construing them:
At first blush, then, the 1972 amendments seem to contain a "catch-22". Shipowners
are not to be liable for negligence of the stevedore, the stevedore cannot be held liable
for it either, but the injured plaintiff is entitled to damages for it. No explicit remedy
for this paradox is provided by the Act.
Id. at 1232.
ul Id.
" Id. at 1233-34. In arriving at this conclusion, the court emphasized that the stevedore-
employer's lien is equitable in nature. Affording the stevedore-employer such a lien when its
negligence contributed to the longshoreman's injury "would clearly violate fundamental
principles of equity." Id. at 1233. For further discussion of the nature of the employer's lien.
see text accompanying notes 130-41 infra.
1975 A.M.C. 1143 (D. Md. 1975).
394 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 1975).
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from the bench after a jury verdict finding the stevedore-employer
and shipowner concurrently negligent," concluded that the Shellman
Rule "can and will produce an equitable result in all circumstan-
ces.""'
The common theme prevalent throughout the cases adopting the
Equitable Credit Doctrine is the belief that the prevailing view im-
poses an unjustifiable burden upon the shipowner. Nevertheless, in
order to reject the majority approach, these courts have been com-
pelled to conclude that the 1972 amendments have modified the prin-
ciples enunciated in Halcyon and Pope & Talbot. Whether this asser-
tion misconstrues the amendments and their legislative history will
be considered later in this section.
C. The Murray Credit Doctrine
While the Murray Credit Doctrine" was adopted by the District
of Columbia Circuit prior to the 1972 amendments, the concepts
advanced by that doctrine still remain good law in that circuit, and
hence are suitable for discussion in this portion of the article. In
Murray, a government employee suffered injuries when an elevator
malfunctioned in a building leased to the United States. The em-
ployee sued the building owner, Murray, who thereupon sought con-
tribution and indemnity from the government. 3 The plaintiff, having
received workmen's compensation from the government employer,
was precluded by the Federal Employees' Compensation Act94 from
bringing an action against it. Because this remedy was exclusive,
Judge Leventhal, writing for the court, concluded that the employer
could not be a joint tortfeasor. Hence, since there was "no common
liability between the employer and the third-party defendant sued in
tort, the employer [could not] be forced to contribute to the other
defendant." '95 Due to the fact, however, that the third party would
have been entitled to contribution had the Act not been in effect, the
court held that his liability to the plaintiff would be limited to one-
half of the total amount of damages.99 The court's conclusion was
premised on the following principles:
" The jury found that the stevedore-employer was fifty percent negligent, the shipowner
forty percent negligent, and the longshoreman ten percent negligent in causing the injury. 1975
A.M.C. at 1143.
" Id. at 1144. Hence, the district judge reduced the $21,000 judgment against the
shipowner to $8,000, which represented forty percent of the total damages. Id. at 1143.
" The doctrine derives its name from Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
I d. at 1363.
5 U.S.C. ch. 81. (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
" 405 F.2d at 1364.
id. at 1365-66 (citing Martello v. Hawley, 300 F.2d 721, 724 (D.C. Cir. 1962)).
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Any inequity residing in the denial of contribution against the em-
ployer is mitigated if not eliminated by our rule. . . that where one
joint tortfeasor causing injury compromises the claim, the other
tortfeasor, though unable to obtain contribution because the settling
tortfeasor had "bought his peace," is nonetheless protected by hav-
ing his tort judgment reduced by one-half, on the theory that one-
half of the claim was sold by the victim when he executed the
settlement. In our situation if the building owner is held liable, the
damages payable should be limited to one-half of the amount of
damages sustained by plaintiff, assuming the facts would have enti-
tled the owner to contribution from the employer if the statute had
not interposed a bar. A tortfeasor jointly responsible with an em-
ployer is not compelled to pay the total common law damages. The
common law recovery of the injured employee is thus reduced in
consequence of the employee's compensation act, but that act gave
him assurance of compensation even in the absence of fault. 7
The significance of the Murray case was magnified by a decision
rendered by the D. C. Circuit four years later. In Dawson v. Contrac-
tors Transport Corp.," the court expressly assumed the continuing
validity of Murray and, more importantly, approved of its applica-
tion to cases brought under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act." Although Murray has not been adopted
outside of that circuit, and despite its drawbacks-which will be ex-
amined later in this articlet'0-the fact remains that the Doctrine
represents impressive authority which must be seriously considered
in developing equitable uniformity under the 1972 amendments.
III. THE NECESSITY FOR JUDICIAL RESTRAINT UNTIL
CONGRESSIONAL OR SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The preceding section explored the different approaches that the
Id. (citations omitted). The logic of the Murray Credit Doctrine would seem to dictate
that the concurrently negligent stevedore-employer's lien be diminished in relation to the extent
that his fault caused the longshoreman's injury. Such an interpretation, however, would be
contrary to the 1972 amendments. See text accompanying notes 147-50 infra.
" 467 F.2d 727 (DC. Cir. 1972).
" Id. at 729-30 n.3. In approving the application of Murray to cases involving the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, the court acknowledged that its holding in Murray' was
severely criticized by one of the district courts within that circuit. See Turner v. Excavation
Constr. Inc., 324 F. Supp. 704, 705 (D.D.C. 1971); note 148 infra & accompanying text.
"I Murray has been criticized by a number of courts and commentators. See. e.g.. Dodge
v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669, 672 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 44
U.S.L.W. 3593 (1976); Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 363, 367-68 (C.D.
Cal. 1974), rev'd, 528 F.2d 675, 680 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 44 U.S.L.W. 3593 (1976):
Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges., 379 F. Supp. 759, 764 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Cohen &
Dougherty, supra note 20, at 605; Coleman & Daly, supra note 56, at 387-88: Robertson, supra
note 82, at 482-83. For a discussion of some of the drawbacks to this doctrine, see note 148
infra & accompanying text.
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federal district and appellate courts have adopted in their efforts to
find a just solution to a troublesome problem. The following discus-
sion will not examine which view is the most equitable one. Rather,
because the two minority views have assumed that the 1972 amend-
ments and more recent Supreme Court decisions have modified the
principles enunciated in Halcyon and Pope & Talbot, the question
must be raised whether such an assumption is correct. If it is indeed
true, as the prevailing view asserts, that Halcyon and Pope & Talbot
are still good law, then it is only for the Supreme Court or Congress,
and not for the lower courts, to overrule those decisions.
In analyzing this issue, the first applicable Supreme Court ruling
which should be considered is Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-A tlantic
Steanrship Corp.'10 Although the contractual indemnity theory devel-
oped in Ryan is inconsistent with both the Halcyon no contribution
rule and the Pope & Talbot no reduction of compensation payments
concept, the fact remains that the Ryan Court did not overrule either
of these cases. Instead, the Court distinguished Halcyon, noting that
the considerations which led to that decision were not applicable in
Ryan.0 2 Hence, although Halcyon and Pope & Talbot lost much of
their force after Ryan,' they nevertheless remained good law.
In a 1972 case the Court reaffirmed the principles enunciated in
Halcyon. In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Erie Lackawanna
Railroad,0 4 the district court dismissed the petitioner's complaint
seeking contribution against the employer. The Supreme Court ap-
proved of the trial judge's ruling, holding that Halcyon was control-
ling.'0 5
Two years later, in Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke,
Inc., '8 the Court held that contribution was permissible in a maritime
noncollision case in which the stevedore was not the employer of the
injured longshoreman. Unlike the employee in Halcyon, the long-
shoreman in Cooper Stevedoring could have proceeded against either
the ship or the stevedore or both to recover his full damages. Finding
no countervailing considerations, the Court concluded that "the well-
established maritime rule allowing contribution between joint tortfea-
sors" should be applied to the instant situation.0 7 The Court, how-
"' 350 U.S. 124 (1956). See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
"1 350 U.S. at 133.
" See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 443-44 (2d ed. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK].
101 406 U.S. 340 (1972).
10s Id.
'*' 417 U.S. 106 (1974).
" Id. at 113. Hence, the crucial distinction between Cooper Stevedoring and Halcyon is
that in the latter case the joint tortfeasor against whom contribution was sought was immune
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ever, went to great length to distinguish Halcyon, stating that the
principles advanced in that holding "still have much force."'18 In
conclusion, the Court once again asserted that "our decision in
Halcyon was, and still is, good law on its facts."' 9
Another recent holding that has been relied upon by those es-
pousing the minority views i10 is United States v. Reliable Transfer
Co."' In that case the Court overruled the century-old doctrine re-
quiring property damage to be equally divided whenever two or more
parties involved were at fault, regardless of the relative degree of each
party's fault."' In promulgating a rule allocating liability for dam-
ages on the basis of proportional fault,"3 the Court adopted a princi-
ple that had been advanced by highly respected jurists and commenta-
tors."4 But in adopting this equitable concept, the Court in no way
from tort liability by statute (i.e., the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act).
', Id. at 112. The Court also emphasized that its decision in Atlantic Coast Line was
consistent with both Halcyon and the case it was presently deciding. Id. at 113-14.
iN Id. at 115.
,' See Coleman & Daly, supra note 56, at 364-65. The authors rely upon the following
language in Reliable Transfer
ITihe Judiciary has traditionally taken the lead in formulating flexible and fair
remedies in the law maritime, and "Congress has largely left to this Court the
responsibility for fashioning the controlling rules of admiralty law." . . . No statu-
tory or judicial precept precludes a change in the rule of divided damages, and indeed
a proportional fault rule would simply bring recovery for property damage in mari-
time collision cases into line with the rule of admiralty law long since established by
Congress for personal injury cases.
United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409 (1975) (quoting Fitzgerald v. United
States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963)) (citations omitted).
What Coleman and Daly fail to comprehend is that, as in Cooper Stevedoring, the Court
did not have before it countervailing considerations. As stated by the court in Lucas v.
"Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges., 379 F. Supp. 759, 764 (E.D. Pa. 1974). "absent considerations
imposed by statutes such as the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
admiralty courts are relatively free to fashion appropriate rules of contribution based on
fairness to the parties." (Emphasis added.)
421 U.S. 397 (1975).
,,2 This rule was established by the Court in The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S.
(17 How.) 170 (1854).
" 421 U.S. at 405. The Court stated:
It is no longer apparent, if it ever was, that this Solomonic division of damages
serves to achieve even rough justice. An equal division of damages is a reasonably
satisfactory result only where each vessel's fault is approximately equal and each
vessel thus assumes a share of the collision damages in proportion to its share of the
blame, or where proportionate degrees of fault cannot be measured and determined
on a rational basis. The rule produces palpably unfair results in every other case.
"I Dissenting in National Bulk Carriers v. United States, 183 F.2d 405 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950), Judge Learned Hand, reflecting on the propriety of the divided
damages rule, stated that this ancient and unjust rule "has been abrogated by nearly all civilized
nations." Id. at 410. Remarking on this rule, Professors Gilmore and Black have stated: "This
result hardly commends itself to the sense of justice any more appealingly than does the
common law doctrine of contributory negligence." GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 103. at 528.
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undermined the continuing validity of Halcyon and Pope & Talbot.
It must be remembered that in these two cases there is present a
countervailing consideration, the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, which makes the stevedore-employer's
liability of compensation payments exclusive. Unlike the circum-
stances of Halcyon and Pope & Talbot, the Court in Reliable Trans-
fer was not confronted with the applicable provisions of the Act, and
thus was able to fashion a rule based on proportional fault.115
It is apparent from the above discussion that no Supreme Court
holding has overruled Halcyon or Pope & Talbot. The next inquiry
is to determine whether the 1972 amendments have modified those
decisions. In their excellent treatise, Gilmore and Black question
whether the language contained in § 905(b) of the Act was meant to
adopt the Halcyon rule."" The authors contend that if Congress had
desired to adhere to the rule of no contribution, it could have inserted
the following language: "The employer, even if his negligence has
contributed to the injury, shall not be liable . ... "I1 If Congress
wanted the one-percent negligent shipowner to pay the longshore-
man's full damages, Gilmore and Black argue, it could have indicated
its intent more clearly." 8
These assertions were considered recently by the Second Cir-
cuit."9 After examining § 905(b), the court disagreed with Gilmore
and Black, concluding that "[w]e see nothing in the statute to exclude
[the adoption of the Halcyon rule]."' 20 Indeed, it may be plausibly
argued that if Congress desired to modify Halcyon and Pope &
Talbot, it would have expressed this intent in clear terms. Thus,
Congress could have provided in § 905(b):
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused
by the negligence of a vessel, then such person . . . may bring an
" See note 110 supra.
"' GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 103, at 451.
117 Id.
"I ld. at 452.
', Landon v. Lief Hoegh & Co., 521 F.2d 756 (2nd Cir. 1975).
,20 Id. at 761 n.4. Upon examining the legislative history to the 1972 amendments, the
Second Circuit arrived at a conclusion directly contrary to that asserted by Professors Gilmore
and Black:
We read the emphasis "in whole or in part" [contained in [1972] U.S. CooE & AD.
NEws 4704-051 to mean to exclude liability by the employer to any extent including
the amount of the compensation payments. If Congress had intended otherwise, it
would simply have excluded employer liability for concurrent negligence "except to
the extent of its compensation payments." We think it is significant that no such
exception was made.
Id. at 763.
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action against such vessel as a third party . . . and the vessel shall
be liable for such injury only to the extent that its proportional
negligence caused such injury ....
Congress, however, did not include this language. Hence, by not
expressly modifying the Halcyon and Pope & Talbot rules when it
had the opportunity to do so, the implication arises that Congress
desired those rules to remain intact.
The language of § 905(b) is susceptible to a number of
interpretations. In such a situation, it is not the role of the lower
courts to construe the statute to overrule Supreme Court authority.
Because of this lack of clarity, if § 905(b) by its terms is contrary to
the principles enunciated in Halcyon and Pope & Talbot, then that
interpretation should come only from the Supreme Court. Lower
court intervention in this troublesome area can cause only further
complications.
Given this sensitive problem, it is particularly disturbing to ex-
amine law review commentaries which severely criticize the decisions
that uphold the validity of Halcyon and Pope & Talbot.' In promul-
gating their decisions, several of these courts expressed their dismay
at the inequitable results which frequently occur.' Nevertheless, rec-
ognizing that it is only for Congress or the Supreme Court to modify
Halcyon and Pope & Talbot, these lower courts have engaged in
judicial restraint.'2 Such an approach is clearly correct. Judicial
activism in this setting not only would undermine the authority of
the Supreme Court and Congress but would also produce chaos
throughout the judiciary, as each tribunal would be imposing its con-
ception of fairness and justness upon the litigants.
Thus, in the absence of clear Supreme Court or Congressional
guidance, the lower courts adhering to the continuing validity of
2 See, e.g., Coleman & Daly, supra note 56, at 386-87 & 412-13.
m See, e.g., Santino v. Liberian Distance Transports, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 34, 35 (W.D.
Wash. 1975), in which the district court acknowledged the inequitable results that frequently
occur in these cases, and proposed the adoption of the following approach:
It would appear to this Court that a scheme might be devised to take care of
the longshoreman who is injured by the concurring negligence of a shipowner and
his own stevedore employer. Such a scheme could provide that an injured longshore-
man might recover as against the negligent shipowner that percentage of his total
damages which the shipowner's fault bore to the total fault and that he might in
addition recover under the Act that percentage of his statutory benefits which the
fault of his stevedore employer bore to the total fault. As against -the negligent
shipowner, the contributory negligence, if any, of the injured longshoreman would
be taken into account.
In declining to adopt this approach, the court stated that under controlling authority it is for
Congress and not the judiciary to remedy this situation. Id.
1 See cases cited note 68 supra.
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Halcyon and Pope & Talbot represent the correct view. But the
question must be raised how the Supreme Court should resolve this
dilemma. The next section of this article shall confront this difficult
question.
IV. SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION OF § 905(b): THE
RECOMMENDED APPROACH
Due to the fact that Congress inartfully drafted § 905(b), the
Supreme Court will have a difficult challenge in construing the stat-
ute to fulfill the congressional intent. But in interpreting this provi-
sion, the Court must remember that its job is not to act as a super-
legislature. 4 Although members of the Court may feel that a certain
construction would better serve the interests of justice, they must
confine their analysis to the terms of the statute itself and its legisla-
tive history. In this manner the Court will be fulfilling the function
which the American democratic system has assigned to it.'1
This section of the article shall explore how the Supreme Court
should resolve the issues that arise under § 905(b) when the longshore-
man is injured by the concurrent negligence of the shipowner and his
stevedore-employer. In particular, the relevant issues will be exam-
ined in the following order: (1) If the shipowner must pay damages
to the injured longshoreman, does he have a right of contribution
against the negligent stevedore-employer? (2) If the answer to (1) is
no, then may the shipowner deduct from the amount of his damages
the past compensation payments made by the stevedore-employer to
the employee, (i.e., will the employer's lien be diminished due to his
concurrent negligence)? (3) Even though the stevedore-employer was
concurrently negligent, is the longshoreman nevertheless entitled to
recover his full damages from the negligent shipowner?
"' The Court does not function as a "super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and
propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions." Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
' As stated by Dean Griswold,
it is one thing to act according to one's personal predilections or choice, and a wholly
different thing to come to one's own best conclusion in the light of his understanding
of the law as it has been established by statute, decision, tradition, received ideals
and standards, and all the other elements that go to make up our legal system ....
The question is how far and how hard [the judge] seeks to be guided by an outside
frame of reference, called for convenience "the law," in arriving at his conclusion,
rather than focusing his intellectual effort, perhaps unawares, on justifying his con-
clusion arrived at somehow or other in some other way.
Griswold, Forward: Of Time and Attitudes-Professor Hart and Judge Arnold. 74 HARV. L.
REv. 81, 92 (1960).
1972 AMENDMENTS
A. Contribution Between Stevedore and Vessel Owner
Upon examining the legislative history and the language of
§ 905(b), it becomes evident that contribution is prohibited by the
Act. In pertinent part, that section provides: "[T]he employer shall
not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and
any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void." The
legislative history also supports this conclusion:
[U]nless such hold-harmless, indemnity or contribution agreements
are prohibited as a matter of public policy, vessels by their superior
economic strength could circumvent and nullify the provisions of
Section 5 [§ 9051 of the Act by requiring indemnification from a
covered employer for employee injuries.
Accordingly, the bill expressly prohibits such recovery, whether
based on an implied or express warranty. It is the Committee's
intention to prohibit such recovery under any theory including,
without limitation, theories based on contract or tort.26
Thus the statute and its accompanying legislative history indi-
cate that contribution as between the shipowner and stevedore-
employer is strictly prohibited. The rationale underlying Congress'
decision is clear. In return for increased compensation benefits paid
to its injured employees regardless of fault, the stevedore-employer
was relieved of any liability in third-party actions. At the same time,
in order to provide an incentive for the shipowner to maintain a
reasonably safe place for the employee to work, Congress introduced
the concept of negligence in third-party actions . 2 But to guarantee
that the economically more powerful shipowner'2 would not shift this
liability to the stevedore-employer, an extra safeguard was devised.
This safeguard explicitly provided in both the legislative history and
the statute itself that the stevedore-employer was not to be liable to
the shipowner under any circumstances. Hence, in return for impos-
ing strict liability upon the employer by way of compensation pay-
ments, Congress made sure that he would be insulated from any
liability to the vessel owner. 29
123 [19721 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 4704 (emphasis added).
'' As stated in the House Report: "Permitting actions against the vessel based on negli-
gence will meet the objective of encouraging safety because the vessel will still be required to
exercise the same care as a land-based person in providing a safe place to work." Id.
'2 Id. See Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669, 671 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3593 (1976); Fitzgerald v. Compania Naviera La Molinera,
394 F. Supp. 402, 408 (E.D. La. 1974); Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges.. 379 F. Supp.
759, 765-66 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
' See Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges., 379 F. Supp. 759, 767 (E.D. Pa. 1974):
It was understood by the members of Congress most directly involved in amend-
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B. Stevedore-Employer's Recovery of Compensation Payments
A more difficult question is raised when one asks whether a
negligent stevedore-employer should be entitled to recoup his com-
pensation payments out of the longshoreman's third-party judg-
ment. With respect to this issue, two different approaches have been
recently advocated, both falling within the Equitable Credit Doctrine.
The first is that the stevedore's lien should be reduced by the percen-
tage of its negligence. 3 Under this approach, if the stevedore-
employer was sixty percent negligent and his compensation payments
totaled $5,000, he would be entitled to a lien of $2,000. The second
approach provides that the stevedore-employer's lien should be dim-
inished by the amount that his negligence reduced the longshoreman's
third-party recovery. One limitation, however, is that the stevedore-
employer's maximum liability cannot exceed the amount of its com-
pensation payments.' Thus, if the longshoreman incurred $10,000
damages caused by the sixty percent negligence of the employer and
forty percent negligence of the shipowner, the shipowner would only
be liable to the extent of his proportional fault, here $4,000. Assuming
that the employer has paid $5,000 in compensation benefits, he would
not be entitled to recover any of this amount. This results because
the stevedore-employer's concurrent negligence diminished the
employee's third-party judgment against the shipowner by $6,000.
The employer, however, does not have to pay an additional $1,000 to
the longshoreman for the reason that his maximum liability is limited
to compensation payments.'
ing the Act that in allowing for any third-party suits Congress ran the risk that
liability would eventually be visited on the employer. It was deemed essential that
clear amending language be used to prevent such an occurrence. The process by
which a consensus was reached to allow for a third-party suit against the vessel for
its negligence illustrates Congress' paramount concern that the employer's liability
under the Act to his employee must be insulated and was intended to be insulated
by the emphatic language of amended subsection 5(b), 33 U.S.C. § 905(b).
"' See Santino v. Liberian Distance Transports, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 34, 35 (W.D. Wash.
1975); Coleman & Daly, supra note 56, at 360 n.33, in which these commentators note:
One proposed approach to the Equitable Credit would alter the method of
calculating the amount of lien repayment while still limiting a shipowner's liability
to that portion of total damages which equals his proportionate fault. Instead of the
Equitable Credit method of reducing the stevedore's lien recovery by the amount of
third-party damages lost by the longshoreman due to stevedore negligence, the pro-
posal would reduce the stevedore's lien in direct proportion to its negligence. Such
an approach was thought to be even more equitable than the Equitable Credit, while
far more appealing to stevedores and thus more likely to prevent tripartite litigation.
However, it is doubtful whether it can achieve either goal.
'"' See Cohen & Dougherty, supra note 20, at 606-07, Coleman & Daly, supra note 56,
at 355-59.
" See Coleman & Daly, supra note 56, at 356-59.
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There is much equity to these approaches. The shipowner is not
liable beyond the percentage of his proportional fault. In return for
being absolutely liable for the longshoreman's injury, the stevedore-
employer's maximum liability is limited to the amount of compensa-
tion payments. The employee, on the other hand, though no longer
able to sue the shipowner for his full damages when the stevedore-
employer is concurrently at fault, receives fairly generous compensa-
tion benefits even when there is no negligence or he is solely at fault
in causing his injury.13
Thus a central premise underlying these approaches is that the
stevedore-employer's right to recover his compensation payments is
equitable in nature. As phrased by a federal district judge, "The
stevedore's right of reimbursement, being equitable in nature, is sub-
ject to equitable regulation . . . .There is no equity in the principle
that a stevedore should be allowed to enforce an unmitigated lien on
a personal injury judgment which has been reduced because of the
stevedore's concurrent negligence."' Such an assertion is undoubt-
edly correct. It indeed is inequitable for a stevedore-employer who
contributorily caused the plaintiff's injuries to escape liability alto-
gether. But this result, under the majority view, is exactly what tran-
spires when the ninety percent negligence of the employer concurs
with the ten percent negligence of the shipowner to cause the long-
shoreman's injury. The employer not only is absolved of liability to
his injured employee but he recovers his compensation payments as
well. This result hardly furthers the interests of justice.
There is, however, one major problem with the adoption of ei-
ther of these Equitable Credit approaches. If the Supreme Court were
to interpret the 1972 amendments according to one of these ap-
proaches, the Court would be contravening the clear intent of both
'3 Advocating their support for the adoption of the Equitable Credit Doctrine. Coleman
and Daly argue:
The Equitable Credit not only appears to be the fairest way of resolving the
conflicting interests of longshoremen, stevedores, and shipowners, it also provides a
reciprocal device to balance the stevedore's right to obtain recompense for its liability
to an injured longshoreman directly from a negligent shipowner. Since a stevedore
is entitled to file suit against a third-party shipowner to recover its lien when its
liability is based, in whole or in part, on the shipowner's negligence, it is difficult to
criticize a system which seeks to protect the shipowner from shouldering the entire
liability when the loss was occasioned, in whole or in part, by the negligence of the
stevedore. At the same time, the congressional design to limit the liability of steve-
dores to the extent of their compensation payments is accomplished.
Id. at 359-62.
"I Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1224, 1234 (D. Ore.
1975) (citations omitted). Hence, "If [the employer's] lien is to be truly equitable, it must be
diminished according to [his] negligence." Id.
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the language of § 905(b) and its accompanying legislative history.
That language provides unequivocably that the stevedore-employer
shall not be liable to the shipowner under any circumstances. Hence,
with respect to the employer, Congress made certain that his sole
liability was that provided under the Act. In this manner,
Congress sought to eliminate all actions against the stevedore
whether for indemnity or contribution, whether based on tort or on
contract, and whether for fees and expenses. Allowance of any such
actions, even a pro tanto recovery to the extent of payments made
by the employer under the Act, would create the circuitous type
action Congress considered was too costly and disruptive of the
compensation scheme to be permitted.'
Those commentators advocating the adoption of the Equitable
Credit Doctrine respond to the above analysis by arguing that deny-
ing the stevedore-employer his compensation lien "cannot be
considered as contribution .... ."I" Such an assertion is patently
incorrect. The incongruity of this argument becomes evident when
one poses the following questions: (1) If the stevedore-employer's
compensation lien is eithei diminished or denied altogether, does the
result benefit the shipowner in that his liability to the longshoreman
is reduced by this amount? (2) Would this amount otherwise be re-
turned to the employer in the form of a lien upon the longshoreman's
judgment against the third-party shipowner? The answer to both of
these questions appears to be "yes."' 13 .As the Supreme Court recog-
nized long ago in its Pope & Talbot decision, reduction or denial of
the stevedore-employer's lien is merely another form of contribution
which the Act expressly prohibits.3 ' The 1972 amendments do not
change this result. "Contribution is still prohibited and any indirect
method to accomplish the same result is also prohibited."'' 9
This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that § 933 contains
specific provisions authorizing a negligent stevedore-employer to re-
coup its compensation payments out of any third-party recovery.
Further, the almost unanimous view permits the employer, even
though concurrently negligent, to recover his lien regardless of
whether he has paid the compensation benefits under a formal award
"I Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges., 379 F. Supp. 759, 769 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (empha-
sis added).
"I See Coleman & Daly, supra note 56, at 399.
13 It can be argued, however, that the longshoreman should be allowed to keep both his
compensation payments and his third-party recovery.
135 346 U.S, 406, 412 (1953).
m Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 528 F.2d 675, 679 n.2 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied. 44 U.S.L.W. 3593 (1976).
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or has made the payments without the entry of such an award.'40 The
rationale underlying this approach is that Congress has sought to
prohibit any attempt by the shipowner to shift liability to the
stevedore-employer. To permit shipowner recovery, even to the ex-
tent of compensation payments, would once again plunge the federal
courts into the circuitous type of actions which proved so disruptive.
Thus, even though the stevedore-employer's lien may be an equitable
one, in enacting the 1972 amendments Congress manifested its intent
to provide the negligent employer with his compensation payments
in full out of any third-party recovery. t4
C. Longshoreman's Recovery Against Negligent Shipowner
The last issue to be raised is whether the longshoreman should
" Hence, the stevedore-employer's remedy under § 933 is not its exclusive remedy. As
stated by the Supreme Court in Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co.. 394
U.S. 404 (1969):
When Congress imposed on the employer absolute liability for compensation, it
explicitly made that liability exclusive. Yet in the same Act it attached no such
exclusivity to the employer's action against third persons as subrogee to the rights
of the employee or his representative.
• . . [W]e can perceive no reason why Congress would have intended so to
curtail the stevedoring contractor's rights against the shipowner. . . . [Tlhis Court
[never] . . has held that statutory subrogation is the employer's exclusive remedy
against third party wrongdoers, and we decline to so hold today.
As to whether the employer has a right to recover his compensation payments regardless
of whether he has made these expenditures under an award, the leading case is The Etna, 138
F.2d 37, (3d Cir. 1943), in which the Third Circuit held:
We find no intent indicated by the Act to take away from the employer who pays
compensation without an award his right to reimbursement out of his employee's
recovery from third persons. On the contrary, we think that the intent and scheme
of the Act requires that the employer's right to subrogation for compensation pay-
ments made in the circumstances here shown be recognized wholly apart from and
without regard for the assignment provided for in Sec. 33(b) of the Act. It is only
the right of control of the employee's right of action against third persons which an
employer foregoes by paying compensation without an award. His right to rein-
bursement out of the recovery for the employee's injury remains unaffected.
Id. at 41 (emphasis added). Accord, Celia v. Partenreederei M.S. Ravenna, 529 F.2d 15, 19
(Ist Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3659 (1976); Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K.
Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3593 (1976): Allen v.
Texaco, Inc., 510 F.2d 977, 979-80 (5th Cir. 1975); Louviere v. Shell Oil Company, 509 F.2d
278, 283-84 (5th Cir. 1975); Fontana v. Pennsylvania R.R., 106 F. Supp. 461, 462-63 (S.D.
N.Y. 1952), affd sub nom. Fontana v. Grace Line, Inc., 205 F.2d 151 (2d Cir.), cert. denied.
346 U.S. 886 (1953). As stated recently by the Fifth Circuit:
The subrogation right where there is no award is a judicial creature with the statute
as a rationale. In cases such as this one, where the employee himself sues the third
party tortfeasor, the courts have long recognized a right of subrogation to the extent
of payments made, and have permitted the employer or its insurer to intervene in
the employee's suit to protect its right, even where the compensation was paid
without the entry of a formal compensation award.
510 F.2d at 979-80 (emphasis added).
"' See Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges., 379 F. Supp. 759, 769 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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be entitled to recover his full damages against the concurrently negli-
gent shipowner or whether the shipowner should be held liable only
to the extent of his proportional fault. With respect to the propor-
tional fault concept, there is language in the legislative history which
supports this view. The House Report states: "The vessel will not be
chargeable with the negligence of the stevedore or employees of the
stevedore."' Some commentators argue that Congress inserted this
language to ensure that the vessel owner would not be liable for more
than his proportional part when the longshoreman's injury is caused
by the concurrent negligence of the shipowner and the stevedore-
employer.4 3
The difficulty with the above argument is that it is inapplicable
when the longshoreman is suing the vessel due to the vessel's negli-
gence. Hence, the House Report only concerns the situation in which
the employee attempts to saddle the shipowner with the negligence
of the employer. In order to protect the shipowner in such a situation,
Congress expressly provided in the legislative history that the vessel
cannot be liable for such negligence.' A far different case is pre-
sented, however, when the vessel is itself negligent. In this situation,
the employee is seeking to recover on the basis that the shipowner
breached his duty of due care toward the plaintiff. Under common-
law negligence principles, it is immaterial insofar as the shipowner's
liability is concerned that other parties may have negligently con-
curred in causing the injury. The plaintiff may proceed and obtain a
judgment against any negligent defendant for his full damages.1
Under the Act, however, the stevedore-employer cannot be sued for
"1 [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4704.
"1 See Cohen & Dougherty, supra note 20, at 606-07; Coleman & Daly, supra note 56,
at 372; Vickery, Some Impacts of the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's & Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 41 INS. COUNSEL J. 63, 66 (1974). In his article, Vickery calls
for the adoption of the Murray Credit Doctrine.
Since the new Act eliminates the shipowner's former action against the steve-
dore for breach of its warranty of workmanlike performance, which if established
gave the shipowner complete indemnity for damages recovered by the plaintiff plus
defensive attorneys fees and expenses, and since there has been "vast improvement
in compensation benefits" (to use the words contained in the Committee report) it
would appear that a strong argument can be made in favor of the applicability of
the Murray credit.
41 INS. COUNSEL J., at 67.
"I See [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4704. Seegenerally Robertson, supra note
82, at 484-85.
"' W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 297 (4th ed. 1971):
[T~he common law developed a separate principle, that a tortfeasor might be liable
for the entire loss sustained by the plaintiff, even though his act concurred or com-
bined with that of another wrongdoer to produce the result-or, as the courts have
put it. that the defendant is liable for all consequences proximately caused by his
wrongful act.
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negligence by the employee nor can he be liable to any third party to
contribute for such an injury. Hence, invariably the injured long-
shoreman is left with only one party to sue under common-law negli-
gence, that being the shipowner. Although this circumstance may
leave the shipowner in an unenviable position, it must be emphasized
that he is in no way being charged with the negligence of the
stevedore-employer. As stated by one court, "This is simply a case
of concurring negligence of the defendant-shipowner and the steve-
dore which, under a negligence theory, still entitles the plaintiff to a
judgment against the defendant-shipowner in the full amount of his
damages."'4
Another incongruity with the proportional fault argument and
the Murray Credit Doctrine as well is the anomalous result that
occurs with respect to the stevedore-employer's right to its compensa-
tion lien upon the plaintiff's judgment in a successful third-party
action. The logic of the Murray and Equitable Credit Doctrines dic-
tates that the concurrently negligent stevedore-employer have his lien
either diminished or denied in relation to the extent that his fault
caused the longshoreman's injury. The 1972 amendments, however,
mandate that the employer be reimbursed out of a third-party recov-
ery for his full compensation payments. 4 Thus, if these doctrines
"I Hubbard v. Great Pac. Shipping Co., 404 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (D. Ore. 1975). One of
the key issues in a third-party action is what standard of negligence should be applied in a
longshoreman's negligeace action under § 905(b). Professors Gilmore and Black argue that the
standards which have been developed in seamen's actions under the Jones Act should be
applied. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 103, at 452-55. Other commentators contend that the
land standard of negligence is applicable. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 82, at 465-66.
The post-1972 decisions hold that the land standard is correct. See Cummings v. "Si-
darma" Soc., 409 F. Supp. 869, 871 (E.D. La. 1976); Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc.,
394 F. Supp. 1092, 1097 (D. Md. 1975); Fitzgerald v. Compania Naviera La Molinera, 394 F.
Supp. 413, 415 (E.D. La. 1975); Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1143,
1146 (D. Md. 1975); Ramirez v. Toko Kaiun K.K., 385 F. Supp. 644, 651 (N.D. Cal. 1974);
Citizen v. M/V Triton, 384 F. Supp. 198, 202 (E.D. Tex. 1974). These decisions base their
reasoning on the legislative history, which states:
The Committee has concluded that, given the improvement in compensation benefits
which this bill would provide, it would be fairer to all concerned and fully consistent
with the objective of protecting the health and safety of employees who work on
board vessels for the liability of vessels as third parties to be predicated on negli-
gence, rather than the no-fault concept of seaworthiness. This would place vessels in
the same position, insofar as third party liability is concerned, as land-based third
parties in non-maritime pursuits.
The purpose of the amendments is to place an employee injured aboard a vessel
in the same position he would be if he were injured in non-maritime employment
ashore, insofar as bringing a third party damage action is concerned, and not to
endow him with any special maritime theory of liability or cause of action under
whatever judicial nomenclature it may be called, such as "unseaworthiness", "non-
delegable duty", or the like.
[19721 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4703.
"I See section IV. B. supra.
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were adopted, a longshoreman successful in a negligence action
against the shipowner would have his recovery reduced either by one-
half (Murray Credit) or by the proportion that the employer's negli-
gence caused the injury (Equitable Credit), and also have an obliga-
tion to reimburse the employer out of his diminished recovery for all
compensation benefits paid under the Act. 4' This result surely could
not have been intended by Congress. Under this approach, when his
injury was caused by the concurrent negligence of the shipowner and
the stevedore-employer, the longshoreman would not have any incen-
tive to bring a third-party action; more often than not in such a
situation, the longshoreman's diminished recovery, rather than going
into his own pocket, would go directly to his employer in reimburse-
ment for past compensation benefits.
Another factor also militates against denying the longshoreman
his full damages against the vessel owner. An important purpose
underlying the 1972 amendments was to eliminate the circuitous type
of actions which proved so costly to the litigants and so disruptive to
the judicial process.' By holding the vessel liable only to the extent
"' See Anthony v. Norfleet, 330 F. Supp. 1211, 1214 (D.D.C. 1971); Turner v. Excavation
Constr., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 704, 705 (D.D.C. 1971). Both of these district courts criticized
Murray for this very reason. Of course, the same rationale is equally applicable under the
Equitable Credit Doctrine if the stevedore-employer is entitled to recover its full compensation
payments.
The Murray Credit Doctrine also has been criticized as being inequitable. The doctrine
only accomplishes a fair result when the stevedore-employer's negligence is fifty percent, the
compensation payments constitute fifty percent of the total damages sustained by the long-
shoreman, and the stevedore-employer is not entitled to recover his payments. Otherwise, "to
apportion on an arbitrary 50 percent divided damages basis (the 'Murray credit') is inequitable
because the actual faults may not be in that proportion." Cohen & Dougherty, supra note 20,
at 605. See Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669, 672 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3593 (1976); Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 1975 A.M.C.
362, 368 (C.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd, 528 F.2d 675, 680 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 44 U.S.L.W.
3593 (1976); Coleman & Daly, supra note 56, at 387-88; Robertson, supra note 82, at 482-83.
' See [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4702-03:
The Committee heard testimony that the number of third-party actions brought
under the Sieracki and Ryan line of decisions has increased substantially in recent
years and that much of the financial resources which could better be utilized to pay
improved compensation benefits were now being spent to defray litigation costs.
Industry witnesses testified that despite the fact that since 1961 injury frequency rates
have decreased in the industry, and maximum benefits payable under the Act have
remained constant, the cost of compensation insurance for longshoremen has in-
creased substantially because of the increased number of third party cases and legal
expenses and higher recoveries in such cases. The Committee also heard testimony
that in some cases workers were being encouraged not to file claims for compensa-
tion or to delay their return to work in the hope of increasing their possible recovery
in a third party action. The Committee's attention was also called to the decision in
1966 of the United States district court in Philadelphia concerning the impact of
third party claims involving injured longshoremen on the backlog of personal injury
cases in that court.
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of its proportional fault, the degree of the stevedore-employer's negli-
gence once again becomes a critical factor. And, of course, the per-
centage of the employer's negligence cannot be determined without
it being in court and represented by counsel. Thus, once the ship-
owner's extent of liability turns on whether the stevedore-employer
was concurrently negligent, many of the evils which Congress sought
to eliminate by the 1972 amendments reappear: (1) The shipowner,
hoping to reduce or eliminate the extent of his liability, attempts to
show that the accident occurred primarily because of the stevedore-
employer's negligence; (2) the stevedore-employer, recognizing that
any reduction in the longshoreman's recovery may diminish its lien
for past compensation benefits, has a direct financial stake in showing
that the shipowner's negligence was solely responsible for the long-
shoreman's injury; (3) the longshoreman, realizing that the amount
of his recovery is directly related to the extent of the shipowner's
negligence, exerts all efforts to prove that his injury was caused solely
by the vessel's fault. The end result is the identical situation that
Congress expressly sought to eliminate. To interpret the amend-
ments, particularly § 905(b), to frustrate this overriding purpose
would represent judicial legislation in the face of congressional man-
date. Congress has expressed its intent and the judiciary's obligation
is to ensure that this intent is furthered rather than nullified.
Additionally, it must be remembered that denying the longshore-
man the full amount of his damages against the negligent shipowner
would not eliminate inequity. Such an approach would simply shift
the inequity from the vessel owner to the injured plaintiff. As stated
by one court: "He would be restricted in his recovery as against the
shipowner without acquiring any offsetting rights under the Act as
against the stevedore employer.""15 Also, to shift the inequitable bur-
den from the financially stronger to the weaker party runs counter
to fundamental interests of fair play. The amount that the shipowner
pays to the injured employee can be passed easily onto the public as
a cost of transacting business. Advocating the implementation of
strict liability against manufacturers of defective products, Mr. Chief
Justice Traynor articulated several arguments that are relevant to the
present situation:
Some two decades ago it seemed to me more forthright, in a concur-
ring opinion in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company, [1511 to fix
liability upon the one best able to anticipate and bear the risks of
injury from defective products. "Those who suffer injury from
IS Santino v. Liberian Distance Transports, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 34, 35 (W.D. Wash. 1975).
' 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
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defective products are unprepared to meet its consequences. The
cost of injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming
misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of
the injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed
among the public as a cost of doing business. . . . However inter-
mittently such injuries may occur and however haphazardly they
may strike, the risk of their occurrence is a constant risk and a
general one. Against such a risk there should be general and con-
stant protection and the manufacturer is best suited to afford such
protection.' ' -
The position advanced by Chief Justice Traynor promotes,
rather than retards, the interests of a humane society. 53 But, unlike
112 Traynor, The Ways and Means of Defective Products and Strict Liability. 32 TENN.
L. REV. 363, 366 (1965) (quoting 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 441). Chief Justice Traynor, a
strong advocate for judicial action, has urged his fellow jurists to engage in judicial creativity
and boldness:
[Tihe real concern is not the remote possibility of too many creative opinions but
their continuing scarcity. The growth of the law, far from being unduly accelerated
by judicial boldness, is unduly hampered by a judicial lethargy that masks itself as
judicial dignity ....
LEGAL INSTITUTIONs TODAY AND TOMORROW 52 (M. Paulsen ed. 1959). See also Traynor,
Statutes Revolving in Common Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U.L. REV. 401, 424 (1968).
"I On other occasions, the Court engaged in judicial activism in order to ensure that the
employee received adequate benefits when he became disabled or injured. The Sieracki decision
no doubt was prompted by this humanitarian consideration. See Comment, The Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972: An End to Circular
Liability and Seaworthiness in Return for Modern Benefits, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 94.99 (1972):
Comment, Negligence Standards Under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act: Examining the Viewpoints, 21 VILL. L. REV. 244, 247
(1976).
Another area of law in which the Court played the role of the legislature was in its decisions
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1970). In construing the statute,
the Court originally required a worker to show employer negligence, including most of the
common-law elements, in order to win his lawsuit. See Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. v. Saxon, 284
U.S. 458 (1932); New York Cent. R.R. v. Ambrose, 280 U.S. 486 (1930); Western & AtI. R.R.
v. Hughes, 278 U.S. 496 (1929). Subsequently the Court reevaluated its approach and inter-
preted the statute favorably toward the employee. See Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S.
108 (1963); Sinkler v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 356 U.S. 326 (1958); Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R.,
352 U.S. 500 (1957). Dissenting in Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350 (1943), Justice
Roberts, joined by Justice Frankfurter, criticized the Court for its activist policy:
I cannot concur in the intimation . . . that, as Congress has seen fit not to enact a
workmen's compensation law, this court will strain the law of negligence to accord
compensation where the employer is without fault. I yield to none in my belief in
the wisdom and equity of workmen's compensation laws, but I do not conceive it to
be within our judicial function to write the policy which underlies compensation laws
into acts of Congress when Congress has not chosen that policy, but, instead, had
adopted the common law doctrine of negligence.
Id. at 358 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Reflecting on this activist trend, a federal circuit judge
stated that the Supreme Court had in all practicality "converted this negligence statute into a
compensation law thereby making . . . a railroad an insurer of its employees." Griswold v.
Gardner, 155 F.2d 333, 334 (7th Cir. 1946). For law review articles discussing the Supreme
1972 AMENDMENTS
the Escola situation, the judiciary in achieving this goal need not
engage in judicial activism. As discussed earlier in this section, Con-
gress has determined that the shipowner must bear the longshore-
man's full damages even though the stevedore-employer was concur-
rently negligent. Hence, judicial activism in this setting would not
only frustrate the congressional purpose of the Act but would also be
contrary to the fundamental interests of justice.
V. CONCLUSION
Upon examining the relevant authorities with respect to the
problems raised when the longshoreman's injury is caused by the
concurrent negligence of the shipowner and stevedore-employer, one
is immediately struck by the incongruity between the views espoused
and the parties who espouse them. First, many of the professional law
review articles appear to have been written by attorneys who repre-
sent primarily shipowner interests. Second, there appears to be a
noticeable lack of professional works that support the longshore-
man's interests. The incongruity arises when one recognizes that these
pro-business as opposed to labor groups traditionally have tended to
advocate judicial restraint rather than activism. The rationale under-
lying this approach is clear: judicial activism has historically repre-
sented a trend toward greater employee recovery at the cost of the
employer or third party."' Under the 1972 amendments, however, the
implementation of an activist approach by the courts would signify
more favorable treatment for the shipowner. Hence, the party who
would ordinarily argue that restraint is the proper role for the judici-
ary is now asserting, of course employing other terms, that only
judicial activism can cure the ills created by Congress.
In all due respect to these commentators, judicial restraint and
not activism is the proper solution to the problem posed by the 1972
amendments. This approach may lead to injustices on certain occa-
sions, but Congress, and not the judiciary, enacted the amendments.
Further, it must be emphasized that although judicial activism may
at times be proper, the issues present in this area involve complex
Court's activist approach in construing the Federal Employers' Liability Act, see Hart, The
Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 97 n.29 (1959); Richter & Forer, Federal
Employers' Liability Act-A Real Compensatory Law for Railroad Workers, 36 CORNELL
L.Q. 203 (1951); Steinberg, The Federal Employers' Liability Act and Judicial Activism:
Policymaking by the Courts, 12 WILLAMETTE L.J. 79 (1975); Comment, The Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act-A Plea for Reform, 14 ST. Louis U.L.J. 112 (1969); Comment, Federal
Employers' Liability Act-Certiorari Practice-Review of the Sufficiency of Evidence, 6 VILL.
L. REV. 549 (1961).
" See note 153 supra.
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policymaking decisions. Judicial interference can only complicate an
already confusing situation. If statutory modification of the 1972
amendments is necessary, this task should be accomplished by the
legislature.
